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Abstract
In 2016, when Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) were first introduced, financial markets,
scholars, and entrepreneurs were captivated by the opportunities and challenges the technology
offered. ICOs quickly became one of the hottest topics in the financial markets. They typically
use blockchain technology to offer so-called “tokens” that can confer various rights to their
holders. The amount of money raised via ICOs has reached $27 billion by the end of 2018.
Commentators have described the ICO bonanza as a new gold rush. Nevertheless, the legal
framework for ICOs remains unclear because traditional securities regulation is designed for
classical securities that are traded on a stock exchange. In late 2017, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) released two statements suggesting that tokens may be subject to
U.S. securities regulation if they meet the requirements for an “investment contract” as laid out
in the Howey test. However, regulators in Asia and Europe remain quite vague on the issue.
In this Article we analyze the legal framework for ICOs in the E.U. It is our view that
investment tokens (including hybrid tokens with some investment functions) are “transferable
securities” under Directive 2014/65/EU on Markets in Financial Instruments. Although
this definition appears to be quite different from the “investment contract” definition under
U.S. law, the financial markets law of the E.U., if applied correctly, comes to results that are
comparable to the outcomes of the investigations carried out by the U.S. SEC. The result
would be a similar framework in two of the most vibrant regions for ICOs. It would be a first
step towards a harmonized application of securities laws to ICOs, avoiding regulatory
patchwork and a possible “race to the bottom.”
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Seventy-three terawatt hours (53.2 TWh). This is the predicted annual
energy consumption of mining Bitcoins based on a projection made on
December 4, 2018.1 It is the equivalent of the annual energy consumption of
Bangladesh, a developing country with 162.9 million citizens.2 It is 0.24 per cent
of the world’s annual energy consumption.3 It is arguably the first time in history
that a payment system might be regulated due to its negative impact on the
environment. The environmental implications are not the sole contributors to
the cryptocurrency hype: If you had invested a mere one hundred dollars in the,
then new, cryptocurrency Ethereum in 2015, and sold everything in January
2018 when the market price reached an all-time high, your investment portfolio
would be valued at $462,000.4 Similar returns on investment were generated by
other cryptocurrencies,5 such as NEO and Spectrecoin.6 It is fair to say that the
world is currently captivated by Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Given these
staggering numbers, it is not surprising that Bitcoin and Ethereum are often
referred to in the general media and even American comedy shows.7 These
cryptocurrencies raise significant and tricky legal questions, such as: Do they
require specific regulation? Are they “real” currencies? How can fraud be
reduced? What is the tax treatment of cryptocurrencies?
Not only is the sheer size of the cryptocurrency phenomenon noteworthy,
but the market has also developed with remarkable speed. In 2009, Bitcoin was
created as the first cryptocurrency.8 Although technically significant,
cryptocurrencies remained a niche of the financial system for years. It was not
until 2016 that the markets realized the enormous potential of the blockchain

1
2
3
4

See Bitcoin Energy Consumption Index, DIGICONOMIST, http://perma.cc/3RPE-DUMQ.
See id.
See id.
The price of Ethereum was 31 cents, and the all-time high was $1432.88 on January 13, 2018. At
the time of submitting this paper, the Ethereum price was about $86; Ethereum (ETH),
COINMARKETCAP, http://perma.cc/YJ8W-EPB5.

5

As of December 2018, more than 2060 cryptocurrencies have been created; see All Cryptocurrencies,
COINMARKETCAP, http://perma.cc/YFX9-39HB.

6

See Jonnie Emsley, 10 Most Successful ICOs of All Time, INVEST
http://perma.cc/D24V-D4H7.

7

See, for example, Cryptocurrencies: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO television broadcast
Mar. 11, 2018).

8

See Alex Hern, Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies – What Digital Money Really Means for Our Future, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2017), http://perma.cc/GB5Q-XK9Y.
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technology9 upon which cryptocurrencies are based. Staff members of the
German
financial
markets
regulator
Bundesanstalt
für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) described the crypto-token bonanza as a
“wave” that started washing over them in 2017.10 In 2016, a modest $98.7
million was raised by initial coin offerings (ICOs) worldwide.11 This increased to
$6.6 billion in 201712 and then $20.3 billion in December 2018.13 As of
publication, more than $27 billion has been raised in about two years. ICOs such
as Filecoin and Tezos each managed to collect more than $200 million from
investors.14 The Russian messaging service Telegram raised a whopping $1.7
billion in two token presales.15 The internet startup Block.one even raised $4
billion without having a live product.16
Currently, the cryptocurrency market seems to be reorganizing itself. Of
the 902 ICOs in 2017, forty-six percent had already failed during the first half of
2018.17 This suggests a high level of incompetence among the issuers and/or a
high level of fraud in the market. Commentators estimate that about ten percent
of ICOs have involved scams, phishing, Ponzi schemes, and other forms of
fraudulent behavior.18 These numbers also emphasize the need for investor
protection provided by financial markets regulation.19 Market insiders have
stated that a growing number of incumbent listed companies are planning to

9

10

11
12
13
14
15

16

17

18

19

“Blockchain” describes a decentralized database that is stored on numerous computers of a
network. It can be utilized for various purposes, such as cryptocurrencies, smart contracts, and
public registers. The concept will be discussed in more detail in Section II of this Article.
Thomas Trossen, Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), Conference Panel Discussion
at BaFin Tech 2018 (Apr. 4, 2018).
See Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2016, COINSCHEDULE, http://perma.cc/8RF8-57YP.
See Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2017, COINSCHEDULE, http://perma.cc/C6NL-7Z4X.
See Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2018, COINSCHEDULE, http://perma.cc/YZN9-Q6B9.
See Coinist 50 Biggest ICOs, COINIST, http://perma.cc/3BN7-RNQ2.
See Paul Vigna, Telegram Messaging App Scraps Plans for Public Coin Offering, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (May 2, 2018), http://perma.cc/AK39-HSCT. The term “presale” describes a token
sale event that issuers initiate before the official ICO campaign commences. Effectively, token
presales are part of the ICO.
See Kate Rooney, A Blockchain Start-Up Just Raised $4 Billion Without a Live Product, CNBC (May 31,
2018), http://perma.cc/2WG2-92FG.
See Thomas Delahunty, About Half of 2017’s ICOs Have Failed Already, NEWS BTC (Feb. 26, 2018),
http://perma.cc/6QE2-KZX6.
See Usman Chohan, Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs): Risk, Regulation, and Accountability, U. NEW SOUTH
WALES DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES: NOTES ON THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (Nov. 30, 2017),
http://perma.cc/6VC5-HR7B.
In this Article, the terms “financial markets regulation” and “securities regulation” are used
interchangeably.
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raise funds using blockchain technology.20 These observations suggest that the
first “ICO gold rush” has slowed down and that the token market is undergoing
a process of maturation.21 However, it is a reasonable assumption that the
market volume will keep growing, with no end in sight. Some commentators
even argue that token sales could reshape the structure of capital markets in
general, similar to the changes to media distribution and retail structures
triggered by the internet.22
Oddly, these developments hang in legal limbo. Starting with the U.S.
Securities Act of 1933, nearly all countries have established rules to regulate their
capital markets.23 The common objectives are to ensure market fairness and
integrity, to protect investors, and to facilitate systemic stability.24 It is evident
that a company issuing crypto tokens online to the public in return for funds
strongly resembles an initial public offering (IPO), in which a company offers
securities to the public at a stock exchange. The latter would be strictly regulated
by securities laws.25 It is also evident that token sales raise issues of investor
protection and that a possible “token bubble” could be a threat to systemic
stability.26 Unsurprisingly, the current Bitcoin hype has been described as the
“biggest bubble in history.”27 So the obvious question that will be addressed in
this Article is: How do ICOs fit into the existing framework of securities
regulation?
This question is difficult to answer. Although numerous financial markets
regulators have issued guidance regarding ICOs, there is still significant
uncertainty in the markets as to which ICOs are subject to financial markets
20

21

22

See, for example, Michael F. Spitz, Managing Director, Main Incubator GmbH, Conference Panel
Discussion at BaFin Tech 2018 (Apr. 4, 2018).
See Charlie Burton, The ICO Bubble is About to Burst... But That's a Good Thing, WIRED (Dec. 15,
2017), http://perma.cc/G98D-N4DM.
See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the
Democratization of Public Capital Markets 6 (U. Tenn. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 338, Cardozo Legal
Stud. Res. Paper No. 527, 2018).

23

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (OICV-IOSCO, the international
association of national regulatory agencies for securities markets) comprises members from 115
jurisdictions, covering 95% of the world’s securities markets; OICV-IOSCO, FACT SHEET at 2
(Feb. 2018), http://perma.cc/6T4Z-EJJM.

24

See OICV-IOSCO, OBJECTIVES
http://perma.cc/SRM6-B6WS.

25

Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2012).
Compare Ryan Surujnath, Off the Chain! A Guide to Blockchain Derivatives Markets and the Implications
on Systemic Risk, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 291–304 (2017) for a discussion on the
systemic risks inherent in blockchain technology.

26

27

AND

PRINCIPLES

OF

SECURITIES REGULATION at 3 (June 2010),

Janine Wolf, Bitcoin, the Biggest Bubble in History, Is Popping, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2018),
http://perma.cc/Q4W4-YPJU.
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regulation. Similar to gold rushes, ICOs attract speculators and dubious market
participants. It is not surprising that several regulators have issued investor
warnings. Even American political commentator and comedian John Oliver
cautioned his viewers against the dangers of investing in crypto tokens, stating,
“You are not investing, you are gambling.”28 The People’s Republic of China29
and the Republic of Korea30 went further, banning all ICOs. This demonstrates
the uncertainty among policymakers and regulators. However, it is doubtful
whether such an approach is sensible because it is undisputed that ICOs present
great opportunities for issuers, such as lower costs of raising capital and a global
audience for the token sale. In the case of China, an outright ban has not been
effective because market participants use workarounds and loopholes.31 The
result has been “comparable to that of a parent telling their rowdy children to
quiet down. The volume may have been turned down a notch or two, but the
activity is still happening.”32
The legal problem is that financial markets regulation is technology-neutral.
This means that the same set of statutory rules apply to financial services and
transactions, regardless of the type of technology used.33 Nevertheless, these
regulations “must also be applied in a proportionate manner, reflecting the
business model, size, systemic significance, as well as the complexity and crossborder activity of the regulated entities.”34 In other words, although the existing
regulatory framework needs to be applied, it must take into account the
particularities of the respective service. The legal status quo creates a high level
of uncertainty among market participants, as some of the established approaches
might not work appropriately in the financial technology (“fintech”) context.
28
29

30

31

32
33

34

See Oliver, supra note 7.
THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, Public Notice of the PBC, CAC, MIIT, SAIC, CBRC, CSRC and
CIRC on Preventing Risks of Fundraising through Coin Offering, (Sept. 8, 2017),
http://perma.cc/9AUV-FSBW; see Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Is Bitcoin Going Out of
Style?, TAX NOTES INT’L MAG. (Sept. 11, 2017), at 1028–29.
See Edward White & Bryan Harris, South Korea Bans Initial Coin Offerings, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept.
28, 2017), http://www.ft.com/content/eb981cd8-9923-37c3-9ec3-e5276b65ee8e.
See Gerelyn Terzo, What Ban? Chinese Investors Continue to Participate in ICOs with Workarounds, CCN
(Mar. 21, 2018), http://perma.cc/BT3Y-CFF2.
Id.
See, for example, Eur. Comm’n, Directorate General Financial Stability, FinTech: A More Competitive
and Innovative European Financial Sector 4, 5, 15 (Consultation Document), http://perma.cc/2JRFHDBM (regarding financial technology regulation in general). According to OICV-IOSCO, most
regulators follow the neutrality approach. OICV-IOSCO, UPDATE TO THE REPORT ON THE
IOSCO AUTOMATED ADVICE TOOLS SURVEY – FINAL REPORT 4 (File No. FR15/2016, Dec.
2016), http://perma.cc/KS6V-DKUT (regarding the regulation of automated advice tools,
specifically).
Eur. Comm’n, supra note 33, at 15.

Winter 2019

553

Chicago Journal of International Law

In the ICO context, the established frameworks for securities regulation
and IPOs are the starting points. It then needs to be asked whether these
established procedures and views take into account the specifics of the new
technology, or whether they need to be reinterpreted to better fit the purpose of
the statutory requirements. This can be illustrated by the way ICO tokens are
marketed, which cannot be compared to a traditional IPO. The latter is
traditionally linked to a stock exchange where the securities are offered and sold.
Online marketing and the publication of prospectuses on websites complement
the stock exchange as the traditional sales channel for IPOs. 35 In contrast, online
marketing is the primary, and often the only, communication and distribution
channel of an ICO. This reversal can have several implications, including the
targeting of investors36 and pre-contractual contact between issuers and
investors.37
The relevance of the issue cannot be overestimated. The markets are
growing quickly and will continue to do so. The most prominent (although not
exclusive) risk for issuers is prospectus liability, which means that investors
could demand the return of their investments if registration was not made and
an investment prospectus was not published. In the U.S., the relevant obligation
is prescribed in § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.38 The corresponding rule under
E.U. law is Article 3 of Regulation 2017/1129.39 Depending on the respective
jurisdiction, issuers could also face fines or even criminal charges.40 To our
knowledge, not a single ICO issuer has published an approved prospectus.41 The
result is legal limbo with huge liability risks for issuers. It is not surprising that
academics42 and interest groups43 have started to evaluate the possible shape of

35

36

37
38
39
40
41

42

See, for example, Where Does Marketing Sit in the IPO Process? Front and Centre!, IMAGINIS (Feb. 22,
2016), http://perma.cc/EBV7-ET2P.
This could be relevant for the question as to where the securities are offered to the public and
how disclaimers need to be designed.
This could be important for the applicable law for prospectus liability.
See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, supra note 25.
Council Regulation 2017/1129, art. 3, 2017 O.J. (L 168) 12 (EU).
See id. at art. 38.
Any company offering securities to the public is required to publish a comprehensive document,
which is commonly referred to as “prospectus.” This document lays out all details regarding the
securities and the issuer that might be relevant for making an informed investment decision.
Before being published, this prospectus must be approved by the competent national regulator.
Under U.S. law, this mechanism can be found in § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, supra note 25.
See, for example, H. Anthony Park, The Essential Principles for an Active Securities Regulation of
Cryptocurrency (last revised May 17, 2018), http://perma.cc/SPM7-W3LQ; Dirk A. Zetzsche et al.,
The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for Regulators, 63 HARV. INT’L L.J.
(forthcoming 2019).
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market standards, codes of conduct, and regulation in general. However, before
discussing new regulatory regimes, the question as to how ICOs fit into the
current legal framework needs to be answered accurately. Otherwise, lawmakers
might presume a need for regulatory reform that is, in fact, unnecessary.
Similarly, lawmakers might be tempted to ignore the need for regulatory reform
on the assumption that the markets are doing well. For the E.U., with its
complicated amalgamation of Directives and Regulations, no convincing answer
has yet been provided.
The technique for the application of securities regulation is similar in most
jurisdictions. The first step is to define the type of unit or certificate to which the
respective regulation applies. This definition is the gateway for the application of
the full array of securities regulation (including, but not limited to, the obligation
to publish a prospectus, the creation of prospectus liability, the prohibition of
insider trading, and the authorization of financial intermediaries involved in
token sales by national regulators). Under U.S. law, the crucial definition is
“security”.44 Under E.U. law, the equivalent is “transferable securities,” which is
contained in European Directive 2014/65/EU on Markets in Financial
Instruments.45
This Article provides an in-depth examination of the financial markets
regulation framework for ICOs in the E.U. This will be compared with the
approach taken by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) based
on established principles of U.S. securities laws. We will try to reconcile the
“substance over form” approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court with the
formalistic “black letter law” approach of E.U. regulation. We argue that it is
possible to reach a widely congruent interpretation for the application of
securities regulation in the U.S. and the E.U. This can be achieved by a
purposeful approach to the definition of “transferable securities” under E.U.
law.
In Section II of this Article, we will give a brief technical overview of
crypto tokens by introducing the three categories of investment, utility, and
currency tokens. Section III will outline the different approaches taken by
national financial market regulators, focusing on the SEC. In Section IV we will
analyze the possible application of E.U. financial markets regulation to crypto
tokens. In Section V we will conclude with a summary.

43

For an overview of current initiatives, see ERNST & YOUNG, EY RESEARCH: INITIAL COIN
OFFERINGS (ICOS) 38 (2017), http://perma.cc/Q733-3TDC.

44

Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a), supra note 25.
Council Directive 2014/65, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349 (EU).

45
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II. T ECHNICAL B ACKGROUND
A. Tokenization in a Nutshell
Initial coin offerings have been made possible by a new way of storing
information in a decentralized way in the so-called “blockchain.” Although this
term suggests some kind of physical embodiment, the blockchain is data that is
stored on computers. The technical basis of this idea is distributed ledger
technology (DLT). In short, DLT describes a decentralized digital database.46 It
contains information records tied together in blocks. These blocks form the
blockchain.47 Every blockchain is based on the source code used by its creator,
and the results can vary significantly. Some can have the sole purpose of creating
new units in the chain while others resemble technology platforms, allowing
companies to use the functions embedded in the source code for a wide range of
applications. As of today, the most famous blockchains are arguably Bitcoin and
Ethereum.
The blocks in the blockchain are often linked together via cryptography.48
The use of cryptographic verification and dispersed storage makes it nearly
impossible to change transaction data stored in the blockchain.49 Each block
contains a hash50 of the previous block, the transaction data, and a timestamp. In
many blockchain systems, computers must process a cryptographic task,
consuming time and (indirectly) money, to generate a new block.51 The
computers of the blockchain verify a new block before adding it to the chain.
The amended chain is then dispersed throughout the network.52 This means that
the information is stored either partly or in full on all computers that are
connected to the network. This dispersion makes it nearly impossible to change
block entries because doing so would require a massive coordinated approach to
46

47

See Sloane Brakeville & Bhargav Perepa, Blockchain Basics: Introduction to Distributed Ledgers, IBM
(Mar. 18, 2018), http://perma.cc/6Z2S-HCYY.
See id.

48

See Michael Mainelli, Blockchain Could Help Us Reclaim Control of Our Personal Data, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Oct. 5, 2017), http://perma.cc/ES8T-6PN9.

49

See Joshua S. Morgan, What I Learned Trading Cryptocurrencies while Studying the Law, 25 U. MIAMI
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 159, 175 (2017).

50

A hash is a mathematically constructed unique fingerprint of a piece of data in the form of an
alphanumeric string. For details, see The Disruptor Series: Digital Currency and Blockchain Technology:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 114th
Cong. 47 (2016) (statement of Paul Snow, Chief Architect and Co-Founder, Factom).

51

See Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 328 (2017).
See Zach Church, Blockchain, Explained: An MIT Expert on Why Distributed Ledgers and Cryptocurrencies
Have the Potential to Affect Every Industry, MIT SLOAN SCH. OF MGMT. (May 25, 2017),
http://perma.cc/L2CC-7CW2.

52
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convince the majority of computers that the changed block contains the correct
information. This principle also makes a blockchain immune to a loss of data
because the breakdown of a single computer, or even several computers, storing
the blockchain does not affect the network as a whole.
Blockchain technology has the potential to disrupt and change the way
businesses operate.53 One possible application is “smart contracts,” which are
contracts that are in part or completely executed without human interaction.54
Some countries are experimenting with land property registers based on the
blockchain.55 There could be further promising applications in the healthcare,
real estate, or insurance sectors.56 However, currently the most famous
application is cryptocurrencies, and the most important implementation is the
Bitcoin.57 A cryptocurrency can be defined as a medium of exchange using the
blockchain.58 Because blocks can be added by users, they stand outside the
control of the central banking system.59 Users have a “wallet,” which is either a
hardware device, a local application, or an online interface provided by a third
party, containing the user’s private key.60 The private key is known only to the
user and is used to sign the cryptocurrencies that the user transfers.61 In order to
send currencies, the sender needs the recipient’s address—the so-called public
key.62 Using this principle, cryptocurrency items can be transferred between
users.63 They can also be used to “pay” for the transfer of other blockchainbased units.
53

See id.

54

See id.; Werbach & Cornell, supra note 51, at 313.
See, for example, Molly Zuckerman, Swedish Government Land Registry Soon to Conduct First Blockchain
Property Transaction, COINTELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2018), http://perma.cc/U7CB-RMVA (discussing
that the Swedish land registry has been testing a Blockchain network to register land and
properties on a “small scale,” and that the first real transaction is expected to take place in 2018).
See Angela Wach, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 713,
737 (2017); S.H. Spencer Compton & Diane Schottenstein, Questions and Answers about Using
Blockchain Technology in Real Estate Practice, 33 PRAC. REAL EST. L. 5, 7 (2017); Angela Garry
Gabison, Policy Considerations for the Blockchain Technology Public and Private Applications, 19 SMU SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 327, 344 (2016).

55

56

57
58

59

See Church, supra note 52.
See Ramis Jamali et al., Cryptocurrency | Digital Asset Class of the Future – Bitcoin vs. Ethereum?, IVEY
BUS. SCHOOL 5 (2016), http://perma.cc/ZR96-TWSS.
See Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA, http://perma.cc/X9LQ-PGNP.

60

See Joseph D. Moran, The Impact of Regulatory Measures Imposed on Initial Coin Offerings in the United
States Market Economy, 26 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (2018).

61

See Stephen Small, Bitcoin: The Napster of Currency, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 581, 588 (2015) (comparing
the private key to a personal identification number (PIN) for a debit card).

62

See id. (comparing the public key to an email address).
See INVESTOPEDIA, supra note 59.

63
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A new phenomenon is the broader term “token.” Tokens represent units
of value, which means they stand in for something. Thus, cryptocurrencies can
be considered a kind of token.64 However, tokens can be used in a broader range
of applications than currencies.65 In contrast to currencies and cryptocurrencies,
which represent value, but are not themselves of inherent value, some tokens
give their owner particular rights or entitlements against another person
(typically the issuer) or record the ownership of assets. Encrypting these rights
on the blockchain is called “tokenization.”66 To create tokens, it is not necessary
to modify an existing protocol or create a blockchain from scratch. Instead,
some existing blockchains (such as Ethereum) provide templates that allow
persons or entities to create their own tokens.67 Tokens that are based on one’s
own blockchain are called “coins.” As the distinction between such coins and
tokens using another blockchain is not relevant in terms of securities law, the
following text only refers to “tokens.”

B. Token Categories
Tokenization can have a huge variety of outcomes. Over the last year,
commentators have established three categories based on the existence or
absence of certain features: currency tokens, utility tokens, and investment
tokens.68 The categorization is based on token functionality. They are not legal
categories; the potential legal classification69 is subject to national or, in the case
of the E.U., supranational regulation. As it is possible to equip a token with
different features, the result can be a hybrid. Hybrid tokens are particularly
difficult to address via the current regulation.70 According to a survey that
included all ICOs between 2013 and March 2017, about seventy-five percent of
64

See Iyke Aru, Tokenization: The Force behind Blockchain Technology, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 29, 2017),
http://perma.cc/AEH4-Q5PQ.

65

See id.
See Addison Cameron-Huff, Op Ed: How Tokenization Is Putting Real-World Assets on Blockchains,
BITCOIN MAG. (Mar. 30, 2017), http://perma.cc/S677-F345.
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 22, at 20–21.

66

67
68

See Alvaro Rivero, Distributed Ledger Technology and Token Offering Regulation 5–6 (Mar. 13,
2018), http://perma.cc/T4WW-XGGG; Lars Klöhn et al., Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), 30
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR BANKRECHT UND BANKWIRTSCHAFT 89, 99 (2018); Iris M. Barsan, Legal
Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings, 2017 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER 54, 56-60
(identifying only two token categories: “currency like” and “security like”); Rohr & Wright, supra
note 22, at 14–26 (distinguishing between “app tokens” and “protocol tokens”).
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For example, as “investment contract” under U.S. law or “transferable securities” under E.U. law.
See the very lengthy analysis provided by Philipp Hacker & Chris Thomale, Crypto-Securities
Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU Financial Law 33–37 (last revised May 2,
2018), http://perma.cc/5HAL-Z3KG.
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all tokens granted access to a service, about fifty percent were used as payment,
and only about twenty-five percent granted profits based on an investment.71
Another study observed approximately forty-five percent payment tokens,
thirty-five percent service tokens, and fourteen percent investment tokens.72
These diverging numbers are probably due to the lack of clearly defined
categories.
Although they are often described as a kind of currency (thus resembling
money), cryptocurrencies have a strong resemblance to a generally accepted unit
of value, such as gold.73 Because, in most cases,74 cryptocurrencies are
decentralized in nature, they lack the ongoing relationship with the issuer, which
is a fundamental element of investment and utility tokens. Most of the existing
cryptocurrencies are open source projects,75 so there is no centralized issuer. The
most famous example is Bitcoin. Currency tokens can be used for payment in
transactions with anyone who is willing to accept them. The trust the market
participant places in the currency token does not flow from the backing of a
federal reserve bank, but from the fact that the blockchain technology
underlying the crypto token is nearly impossible to manipulate.76
Investment tokens give the owner the right to participate in the issuer’s
future returns. This could be payments similar to dividends, or fixed payments
including a mark-up reflecting the investment risk. Another typical, albeit not
necessary, feature is the conveyance of voting or other participation rights.
These tokens resemble classical securities. A prominent example is the
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO).77 In the DAO ICO, the funds
raised were intended to be used to finance other projects, thus generating
returns for DAO token subscribers. A group of people who were involved in
issuing the DAO tokens (the “Curators”) would preselect suitable projects. The
token subscribers could then vote on which of these projects should be
financed.78
71

72

See Token Rights: Key Considerations in Crypto-Economic Design, SMITH & CROWN (Mar. 30, 2017),
http://perma.cc/2TDF-V8BW.
See Zetzsche et al., supra note 42, at 8.
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See Peter Zickgraf, Initial Coin Offerings – Ein Fall für das Kapitalmarktrecht?, 63 DIE
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 293, 296 (2018).
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Bitcoin, Monero, and Verge are examples of cryptocurrencies that are decentralized.
See, for example, VERGE, http://perma.cc/D3EV-8FWA; What is Monero?, MONERO,
http://perma.cc/XWN3-EWRW.
See Barsan, supra note 68, at 57.
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An important aspect of the DAO ICO, which will not be discussed in further detail here, is that it
was not directly linked to a registered company. Thus, technically speaking it was an ICO without
an issuer. For discussion, see id., at 62.
See id., supra note 68, at 58.
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The third category is utility tokens. They offer a wide variety of benefits for
the owner. This could be access to particular services offered by the company,
such as the use of storage space (Filecoin). Utility tokens also often have
elements of currency or investment tokens,79 as demonstrated by the Munchee
token, which allowed payment in restaurants (currency token) and incentivized
food reviews (utility token), but also allowed secondary trading (investment
token).80

C. Initial Coin Offerings
As soon as an issuer has finished creating tokens (typically using an
established platform such as Ethereum), the tokens can be advertised and sold.
The standard procedure is that issuers manage the sale through an internet
platform. By using smart contracts, investors can exchange cryptocurrencies for
the new tokens.81 The advertising campaign primarily relies on social media
channels.82 As a consequence, the targeted investor audience is younger and
more tech-savvy than in traditional capital markets. It is standard market practice
that the issuer publishes a so-called “white paper” on its website.83 This
document typically contains information about the issuer and its business, the
available tokens, and the investments planned. Although some white papers are
quite comprehensive, their level of detail cannot be compared with a prospectus
required under securities regulation.84 For example, while under securities
regulation it is required that the prospectus contains detailed information about
the issuer, this element is very often missing from white papers.85 The
established term for this whole process is ICO, quite obviously based on the
introduction of securities on a stock exchange in an IPO.
For issuers, ICOs come with a range of advantages. First, they are
marketed directly to the client, circumventing the typical range of financial
intermediaries such as banks and stock exchanges. This increases the speed of
the offering process while significantly cutting capital costs. Second, the
79

80

The SEC concluded that the Munchee token was a security and ordered organizers to stop
offering and selling it to the public.
For a description of the SEC intervening to stop the Munchee ICO, see Press Release No. 2017227, U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Company Halts ICO after SEC Raises Registration Concerns
(Dec. 11, 2017), http://perma.cc/JSS2-37U5.
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See Moran, supra note 60, at 7; Aubrey K. Noonan, Bitcoin or Bust: Can One Really “Trust” One’s
Digital Assets?, 7 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 583, 593 (2015).
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See Zickgraf, supra note 73, at 294.
See Zetzsche, et al., supra note 42, at 10.
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See id.
See id. at 11.
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technology required is relatively simple and accessible. The ERC20 Token
Standard,86 a standardized Ethereum smart contract, allows the issue of a token
using 57 lines of smart contract code.87 Fewer than 100 lines of code seems to be
typical in the industry.88 These lower barriers allow for a “democratization” of
capital markets89 because market entry for issuers is facilitated. For example, an
ICO can open the gate to capital markets for businesses that, due to their legal
nature, are unable to be listed at a stock exchange (including, among others,
partnerships or private limited companies). Third, fueled by the crypto bonanza,
the amount of money that can be raised is far higher than with other fintech
models, such as crowdfunding.90 As ICOs can be offered to a global audience via
the internet, they can theoretically raise even more funds than traditional IPOs,
which are typically limited to a single stock exchange. Fourth, issuers seem to
believe that they are not within the scope of financial market regulation,
including prospectus requirements and disclosure/reporting obligations.91 It
remains to be seen if this really is the case.
At the end of 2017, the U.S. was the central hub for ICOs. Issuers from
the U.S. raised more than $1 billion.92 In the E.U. member states, $575 million
was raised, followed by Russia ($310 million), Singapore ($260 million), the
People’s Republic of China ($256 million), and Hong Kong ($196 million).93 In
terms of number of token sales, the E.U. member states came first (125 ICOs),
followed by the U.S. (76), Singapore (37), Russia (33), and Switzerland (32).94
This demonstrates (maybe against common perception)95 that the E.U. is also a
central hub for ICOs.96
86
87
88
89

See ERC20 Token Standard, ETHEREUMWIKI, http://perma.cc/9DPB-ZFBD.
Rohr & Wright, supra note 22, at n. 1.
See Zickgraf, supra note 73, at 295; Rohr & Wright, supra note 22, at 21.
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 22. A similar point has been made with respect to crowdfunding, see
Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon Walker, The Global Significance of Crowdfunding: Solving the SME Funding
Problem and Democratizing Access to Capital, 7 W. & M. BUS. L. REV. 347 (2016).
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The average crowdfunding campaign only raises about $7000, see Crowdfunding Statistics,
FUNDABLE, http://perma.cc/AK36-T72N.
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See Zetzsche et al., supra note 42, at 11 (“Almost all ICOs rely on legislative loopholes or, more
accurately, what the issuing entity hopes (or prays) is a loophole or grey area.”).
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See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 43, at 7.
See id.
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See Max Galka, Token Sale Geography, ELEMENTUS (Dec. 30, 2017), http://perma.cc/89C7-YJ7H.
It is obvious that websites with statistics on ICOs and token sales focus on particular countries in
Europe. See, for example, ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 43, at 7. However, from a legal perspective
this is inaccurate because the E.U. provides a uniform legal framework for ICOs.
For another study identifying that 20% of all ICOs are based in the E.U., confirming this
conclusion, see Zetzsche et al., supra note 42, at 13.
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D. Consequences
The parallels between ICOs and IPOs are obvious, exceeding the similarity
in nomenclature. In particular, an offer of tokens to the public exhibits the same
information asymmetries as between issuers and investors. The mitigation of
information asymmetries is a core concept of financial markets regulation. These
asymmetries can lead to negative results for the market as a whole.97 The
potential lack of regulation and enforcement is particularly tempting for
scammers and other miscreants because misconduct will mostly go unpunished.
This is commonly referred to as the moral hazard problem.98 When an industry
or particular investment vehicle develops a reputation of being a stomping
ground for fraudsters, investor confidence might deteriorate. These
developments call for investor protection and the promotion of market
efficiency, which are two of the main objectives of financial markets regulation.99
Some commentators are also warning of an ICO “bubble” that may burst
soon.100 The crash of the Bitcoin market in 2017-2018, when the price dropped
to less than half of its December 2017 value,101 was probably a warning sign.
Moreover, ICOs are vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing due
to the almost anonymous nature of the transactions and the large sums involved.
At the time of publication, the overall ICO volume already exceeds $20
billion, and no end to growth is in sight. Given the current market
developments, it is quite likely that established companies will see ICOs as a
viable option to raise capital. It would be a severe inconsistency if a listed
company is subject to the full brunt of financial markets regulation, while a
company issuing tokens that are tradable, and would essentially give their owner
shareholder rights, would not be covered by regulation. If an unregulated parallel
market for securities-like tokens emerges, the burst of a bubble could have

97

98

99

See George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J.
ECON. 488 (1970) (describing the so-called “lemons problem”); see also Bernard Black, The Legal
and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 786 (2001) for an
identification of unregulated securities markets as good candidates for lemons.
See Zetzsche et al., supra note 42, at 15 for a description that many white papers do not include
information about the financial situation of the issuer. For example, over ninety-six percent of
white papers remained silent about the way the money is collected from investors (pooling vs.
segregation).
See OICV-IOSCO, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, at 3.

100

See, for example, Jim Edwards, This Is the Tech Bubble We Have Been Waiting For, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Nov. 21, 2017), http://perma.cc/LJ3Y-S748.

101

See Frances Coppola, Bitcoin's Bubble Is Bursting. How Low Will Prices Fall?, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2018),
http://perma.cc/7SB5-2QC6.
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catastrophic consequences.102 Therefore token regulation is also an issue of
systemic stability. Thus, it is beyond question that ICOs should be subject to
financial markets regulation in principle.

III. R EGULATORS ’ A PPROACHES
The basic problem with token regulation is that tokens are offered via the
internet and are thus a worldwide operation. In contrast, financial markets
regulation, supervision, and enforcement are still subject to national laws.
Although common principles have been established in recent decades,103 the
intricacies and definitions of the national frameworks still vary. Even more
importantly, national regulators and courts may interpret statutory rules and case
law differently. A second problem is that national regulators would find it
particularly difficult to take action against token offers managed by entities based
in a foreign country. For example, the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
seems to be painfully aware of its limited powers, stating laconically that ICOs
“might be based overseas.”104
Thus, it is not only important that national regulators provide guidance for
the application of securities laws; it is also highly desirable that these regulators
try to find common ground by establishing comparable tests and guidelines for
the application of securities laws to ICOs. Based on a common understanding,
cooperation between national agencies can be intensified, ideally resulting in a
harmonized application of national securities laws that are not consistent on
paper. Harmonization efforts between regulators are typically carried out by the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the umbrella
organization of national financial markets regulators. 105 At the time of writing
this paper, the IOSCO had not published its view on the regulation of ICOs.
In other words, although there is a growing consensus between national
regulators that tokens need to be regulated in principle, as will be discussed in
the following paragraph, there is no consensus about how exactly crypto tokens
fit into the current securities law frameworks. As will be demonstrated in this
Section, some regulatory authorities (for example, in the U.S. and Singapore)
have made their views clear, while others (particularly in Europe) remain vague.
102

For more details on the size and structure of the emerging market and the resulting systemic risk,
see Zetzsche et al., supra note 42, at 17–20.
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See, for example, OICV-IOSCO, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 24, for the principles of
international securities regulation.
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U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, Distributed Ledger Technology – Feedback Statement on Discussion
Paper 17/03, at 15 (Dec. 2017), http://perma.cc/U92Q-VVJZ. It is not surprising that the U.K.
FCA highlights its limited competencies when stating that ICOs “might be based overseas.”
See OICV-IOSCO, FACT SHEET, supra note 23.
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It will also be demonstrated that two different understandings of “securities” are
applied, either focusing on the investment or on the tradability in capital
markets.

A. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
The SEC was the first regulator to take a clear stance regarding the
application of U.S. securities laws to token sales.106 On July 25, 2017, the SEC
released a report regarding the application of U.S. securities laws to the DAO
token.107 The DAO is a network of smart contracts designed in Germany in
2016. The tokens gave investors the possibility to suggest how the raised funds
should be invested. The tokens also granted voting rights regarding the
proposals and participation rights in future profits.108 The important point here
is that the DAO token exhibited some similarities to a share, but also to a
collective investment scheme.
The issue was whether the DAO token was an “investment contract,”
which is a catchall109 subcategory of the term “security,” the fulcrum for the
application of U.S. securities laws. It is designed to apply to new and innovative
financial vehicles that do not have the form of classical securities (such as shares
or bonds), but convey similar rights. The SEC applied the Howey test established
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1946.110 The test involves four factors that all need
to be present for there to be an investment contract: (1) the investment of
money, (2) a common enterprise, (3) a reasonable expectation of profit, and
(4) profit derived from the managerial efforts of others.111 It is a typical example
of a flexible “substance over form” approach112 because it focuses on the
outcome of a transaction and not its appearance. Interestingly, the Canadian
106

107

The SEC even set up a mock ICO (“HoweyCoin”) to warn investors against ICO scams. See Press
Release No. 2018-88, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The SEC Has an Opportunity You Won’t
Want to Miss: Act Now! (May 16, 2018), http://perma.cc/6A88-9NS4.
See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Release No. 81207, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section
21(a) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO (July 25, 2017),
http://perma.cc/C8V7-JNJJ.

108

For more detailed discussion, see Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 10–11; Rohr & Wright,
supra note 22, at 24–25.
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See Rohr & Wright, supra note 22, at 43.
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). This test was later refined in SEC v. Edwards, 540
U.S. 389 (2004). For detailed discussion, see JOHN C. COFFEE & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES
REGULATION – CASES AND MATERIALS 247-269 (12th ed. 2012).

110

111
112

See id.
See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (“Because securities
transactions are economic in character Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn
on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto.”).
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Securities Administrators (CSA) released a notice on August 24, 2017, stating
that they apply exactly the same test to Canadian ICOs.113
In short, the SEC found that the tokens issued by the DAO amounted to
an investment contract and were hence securities. Investors paid for the DAO
tokens using Ethereum tokens, which is a contribution of value and thus an
“investment of money.”114 The SEC argued that the DAO was a for-profit
undertaking. The token holders stood to share in potential profits from the
contracts. This constituted a “common enterprise” and a “reasonable
expectation of profits.”115 These profits were to be derived from the German
company Slock.it (which was involved in setting up the DAO project) and the
DAO Curators (a group of people chosen by Slock.it whose task was to review
suggested investment projects).116 The SEC found that, although the investment
decisions were made by the token holders, Slock.it and the DAO Curators made
significant contributions to the process. Therefore, the expected profits were
derived from the managerial efforts of others. As no valid exemptions applied,117
the DAO token was required to be registered with the SEC.
A few months later, the SEC reiterated its stance in the Munchee order. 118
It found that the tokens (the MUN tokens) were offered and sold in violation of
securities laws.119 Similar to the DAO investigation, the SEC argued that the
MUN tokens were investment contracts. The important difference is that the
MUN tokens gave their holders several rights, including utility rights. The SEC
took the view that the fact that the MUN tokens had a “practical use … would
not preclude the token from being a security.”120
In essence, the SEC has confirmed that what are typically referred to as
investment tokens (for example, DAO) and hybrid investment/utility tokens
(for example, Munchee) are subject to U.S. securities laws. The SEC applied a
particularly wide understanding, especially regarding hybrid tokens. The SEC did
not restrict its jurisdiction to ICOs in the U.S. As a result, all ICOs, irrespective
of their country of origin, could potentially end up in the SEC’s crosshairs. The
113

114
115
116
117
118

119
120

See CANADIAN SEC. ADM’RS, Cryptocurrency Offerings (CSA Staff Notice 46-307, Aug. 24, 2017),
http://perma.cc/NP5C-FT73.
SEC REPORT: THE DAO, supra note 107, at 11.
Id. at 11–12.
See id. at 12–15.
See id.
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Release No. 10445, Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings
Pursuant to Section 8(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a Ceaseand-Desist Order, In the Matter of Munchee, Inc. (Dec. 11, 2017), http://perma.cc/T52S-PRXQ.
See id. at 9.
Id.
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markets reacted quickly, and various ICOs started to ban U.S. investors from
subscribing for tokens.121

B. E.U. Regulators
The pivotal term of E.U. financial markets regulation is “transferable
securities.” For example, E.U. prospectus regulation applies to offers of
securities to the public.122 Directive 2014/65/EU on Markets in Financial
Instruments (MiFiD2) revolves around “financial instruments,” which pursuant
to section C of annex I includes “transferable securities.”123 Regulation (EU)
596/2014 on Market Abuse (MAR) also applies to “financial instruments” as
defined under MiFiD2.124 Thus, the question is whether tokens are “transferable
securities” within the meaning of the uniform definition under E.U. financial
regulation. It is obvious from the wording that the definition is based on the
transfer of units in the secondary market, not on the underlying investment
characteristics. This is a major deviation from the U.S. approach which focuses
on the “investment contract.”
It is important to note that market supervision and law enforcement are
still vested in the national financial markets regulators of the E.U. member
states. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is, inter alia,
tasked with the promotion of supervisory convergence and the consistent
application of market rules.125 However, front line regulation is still carried out
by national agencies. The result is that financial markets supervisors in the E.U.
are not speaking with one voice.

1. European Union (ESMA)
The ESMA published information regarding tokens sales in November
2017.126 However, it remained vague, stating that “… where the coins or tokens
qualify as financial instruments it is likely that the firms involved in ICOs
conduct regulated investment activities.”127 Potentially applicable E.U. regulation
includes prospectus regulation, financial intermediaries regulation, fund
121

See Wendy McElroy, Some ICOs Now Ban Americans – Who Should Expect More Ostracism,
BITCOIN.COM (July 18, 2017), http://perma.cc/X7NJ-8B7G.
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Council Regulation 2017/1129, supra note 39, at art. 1(1).
Council Directive 2014/65, art. 2(1), 2014 O.J. (L 173/349) (EU).
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See Council Directive 596/2014, art. 3(1)(1), 2014 O.J. (L 173/1) (EU).
Who We Are, EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKETS AUTHORITY, http://perma.cc/482A-9EJB.
ESMA alerts firms involved in Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) to the need to meet relevant
regulatory Requirements (Doc. No. ESMA50-157-828 EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKETS
AUTHORITY, http://perma.cc/A4BP-9QS4.
Id. at 1.
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managing regulation and anti-money laundering regulation. Precise guidance as
to which tokens were “financial instruments” was not provided.

2. United Kingdom (FCA)
In 2017, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) conducted a consultation
on distributed ledger technology. In Annex 1 of the resulting feedback
document it published some regulatory considerations on ICOs.128 It highlighted
that carrying out regulated activity relating to investments without obeying the
relevant rules was a criminal offense.129 However, the FCA remained rather
generic on the classification of tokens, stating that some tokens may constitute
transferable securities and therefore may fall within the prospectus regime. 130
The FCA also issued general consumer warnings about ICOs,131 in addition to
specific warnings about investing in cryptocurrency contracts for difference.132
This cautious approach is surprising because the FCA is generally positive on the
use of new technology in the financial markets.133 In April 2018, the FCA
released additional guidance regarding derivative contracts on cryptocurrencies,
making it clear that derivatives on crypto tokens are transferable securities and
that providing financial services in this regard requires formal authorization.134

3. Germany (BaFin)
The German BaFin issued guidance in February 2018.135 It went into more
detail than its U.K. counterpart. All tokens needed to be assessed on a case-bycase basis,136 which means that the BaFin avoided far-reaching statements about
the classification of tokens. However, tokens granting shareholders’ rights or
comparable rights could be classified as securities.137 Derivatives on tokens
128

FCA, supra note 104, at 28.

129

Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.

130
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Consumer warning about the risks of Initial Coin Offerings (‘ICOs’), U.K. FINANCIAL CONDUCT
AUTHORITY (Sept. 12, 2017), http://perma.cc/4YV4-4XJG.
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Consumer warning about the risks of investing in cryptocurrency CFDs, U.K. FINANCIAL CONDUCT
AUTHORITY (Nov. 14, 2017), http://perma.cc/5ZQ4-LRPA.

133

See, for example, FCA Innovate, U.K. FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, http://perma.cc/MYK4AG5C.
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Cryptocurrency derivatives – FCA statement on the requirement for firms offering
cryptocurrency derivatives to be authorised, U.K. FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Apr. 6,
2018), http://perma.cc/G8GV-UDB2.
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Initial Coin Offerings: Hinweisschreiben zur
Einordnung als Finanzinstrumente, Doc. No. WA 11-QB 4100-2017/0010 (Feb. 20, 2018),
http://perma.cc/A2B9-TZ76.
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would be classified as financial instruments and thus subject to financial markets
regulation. In addition, it classified crypto exchanges as multilateral trading
facilities,138 meaning they would require authorization by the national
regulators.139

4. France (AMF)
In October 2017, the French Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF)
published a discussion paper on ICOs.140 The AMF remarked that tokens may
be classified “as equity securities if they bestow the same economic and
governance rights as those traditionally attached to shares or preference
shares.”141 Additionally, the AMF argued that tokens could also in principle be
classified as debt securities.142 However, the AMF concluded that at the time of
publishing the paper, the tokens issued in France would not be classified as
securities and thus would not fall under French regulations.143 Similarly to the
FCA and BaFin, the AMF took the view that crypto derivatives are securities
and subject to financial markets regulation.144

C. Singapore
In August 2017, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) issued a
notice stating that if a token constitutes a product regulated under securities laws
administered by the MAS, the offer needs to comply with the applicable
securities laws.145 In November 2017, the MAS published a more detailed
analysis.146
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Id. at 4.
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The applicable Singaporean law for offers of securities is contained in the
Securities and Futures Act (SFA). The key definition of a security is a “capital
markets product,” which is defined in section 2(1) SFA, inter alia, as “any
securities, futures contracts, contracts or arrangements for the purposes of
foreign exchange trading … and such other products as MAS may prescribe as
capital markets products.”147 Typical examples are shares, debentures, and units
in a collective investment scheme.148 The MAS also addressed token sales from
outside Singapore. Operators of such extraterritorial platforms for ICOs may
also be subject to the SFA and its requirements.149
The MAS included six case studies in its release, providing guidance for
typical and non-typical token sales.150 Although the MAS labeled the case studies
as not indicative, conclusive, or exhaustive,151 the case studies give an excellent
idea of the MAS’s views. For example, tokens comparable to shares would be
considered securities (Case 2), while tokens granting access to company services
would not (Case 1). The MAS also emphasized that tokens resembling loan
agreements would be classified as debentures and thus securities (Case 5). If
token offers are not accessible in Singapore (in other words, the tokens will not
be offered to any person in Singapore), the SFA will not apply (Case 4). In
several cases the MAS pointed out that services revolving around the ICO (for
example, facilitating the purchase or providing financial advice) would most
likely result in the need to obtain a Singaporean capital markets license. The
MAS did not go into detail regarding the classification of hybrid tokens. Thus,
some commentators presume that the MUN token, which only granted limited
investment rights, would most likely not have been classified as a security. 152

D. Australia
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) issued a
guidance statement in October 2017.153 The most relevant definition is
“security,” pursuant to section 700 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which

147
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refers to section 761A of the Act.154 ASIC stated that if the rights attached to the
coin are similar to rights commonly attached to a share, then it is likely that the
coins could fall within the definition of a share. Such rights could be ownership
of the body, voting rights in decisions of the body or some right to participate in
profits of the body.155
ASIC also considered whether a public token offer and the ensuing
investments might constitute a managed investment scheme (MIS) as defined in
section 9 of the Corporations Act. In broad terms, an MIS requires people to
contribute assets such as digital currency to obtain an interest in the scheme.
These assets are pooled together with one or more other contributors, or used in
a common enterprise, to produce financial benefits or interests in property. The
contributors do not have day-to-day control over the operation of the scheme
but, at times, may have voting rights or similar rights.156 ASIC took the view that
a “right” is to be interpreted broadly and includes rights that may arise in the
future or on a contingency, and even rights that are not legally enforceable.157 If
the value of the coin is related to the management of the arrangement, the issuer
of the ICO is likely to be offering an MIS.158 In practice, most ICOs will meet
these requirements,159 making the token offerings subject to Australian securities
laws.

E. New Zealand
Similar to ASIC, the New Zealand Financial Markets Authority (FMA)
focused on whether investment tokens can be debt securities or equity securities,
repeating the definitions given in section 8 of the Financial Conduct Act 2013
(NZ) without going into much detail.160 More significantly, the FMA also
discussed whether utility tokens are “managed investment tokens” under section
9.161 The three key requirements are: (1) the investment of money or
cryptocurrency, (2) the provision of returns, income and rewards to the
154

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 700 (Austl.). The definition of “shares” and “securities” is
convoluted. For a more detailed discussion in the ICO context, see Gordon Walker, Crowd-Sourced
Funding, Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings in Australia and New Zealand, 36 CO. & SECURITIES
L.J. 1, 5–7 (2018).
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AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES & INVESTMENT COMMISSION, supra note 153, at 2.
Id. at 2.

156
157
158
159
160

161

Id.
Id.
Walker, supra note 154, at 115–17.
Financial Conduct Act 2013, s 8 (N.Z.). Initial Coin Offers, FINANCIAL MARKETS AUTHORITY,
http://perma.cc/V27L-J7YP.
See also Walker, supra note 154, at 116–17.
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investors, and (3) that investors do not have day-to-day control over the
project/business.162 This will typically apply to investment tokens. In the eyes of
the FMA, tokens are not considered managed investment products simply
because they can be traded on a cryptocurrency exchange or other secondary
market.163 In addition, offering utility tokens through an ICO typically involves
the financial service of “operating a value transfer service” and/or “issuing and
managing a means of payment.”164 As a result, New Zealand’s financial
intermediaries regulation may apply.

F. Discussion
While it is not surprising that various national securities law frameworks
apply different terminology, the structures are highly comparable. The SEC’s
investigations and orders have set the tone for the debate on tokens under
securities laws. The pivotal term “investment contract” is a subcategory of the
general term “security.” Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand follow a two-tier
approach, distinguishing between tokens as securities and tokens as collective
investment agreements. This seems to differ from the approach taken by the
SEC. However, in these three jurisdictions the relevant issue is about
investment, at least in principle, allowing a distinction between the three token
categories. This is very similar to U.S. law.
However, the E.U. framework is an outlier. By focusing on the tradability
of tokens on the secondary capital market, the E.U. framework completely
differs from the investment-based approach taken by the other jurisdictions
discussed above. E.U. regulators remain vague and stress the need for a case-bycase assessment, which makes the legal situation even more confusing. Apart
from the rather special case of crypto derivatives, no strong statement on the
regulatory nature of tokens has been made. Issuers and investors are left alone
with a vague “maybe tokens are securities.” This is not satisfying for market
participants.
It is our view that the SEC’s approach is sensible. Its strict application of
established case law to token sales might be unpopular among issuers, but it is
logical, predictable, and provides a high level of investor protection. Lowering
the regulatory standards for token sales could lead to a “race to the bottom”165
162

FINANCIAL MARKETS AUTHORITY, supra note 160.

163

Id.
Id.

164
165

The “race to the bottom” was an argument raised in the wake of the internationalization of
securities markets in the 1990s. It criticized the idea of countries competing for foreign
investment by framing their securities laws in a particular fashion that would be beneficial to
investors. For an overview, see Rhys Bollen, International Standard-setting and the Regulation of Hedge
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with potentially severe consequences for the stability of the financial markets.
The result would be a regulatory patchwork that enables issuers to structure an
ICO in a way that allows the sale of tokens subject to jurisdictions with a low
regulatory burden. The worst-case scenario would be a shift of ICO activities
towards “ICO havens,” making it impossible for investors to gain redress for
misleading or fraudulent token sales. The result of this mechanism can already
be observed in the U.S. ICO market. It is a reasonable assumption that the strict
SEC enforcement policies are the major driver of token issuers leaving the U.S.
market.166
Instead, we suggest an approach that has been described in the past as the
“race toward the hegemon.”167 As scholar Rhys Bollen argues, “[e]xperience
shows that the standard of the most powerful player is often the one that
dominates in a network.”168 In international financial markets this is usually the
U.S. or the E.U. This is because these economic areas had the best-developed
capital markets in the 1990s when the internationalization and standardization of
the capital markets gained momentum. As shown in Section II, these two
economic areas are again arguably the two most important hubs for token sales.
Obviously, countries such as Singapore, Russia, Australia, Switzerland, and Israel
are also important. However, none of them alone has developed an ICO market
that can be compared to the U.S. or the E.U.
Thus, the questions we ask are: how do tokens fit exactly into the E.U.
framework of “transferable securities”? Is it possible to classify tokens in the
E.U. in a similar fashion as in the Howey test? Is it possible to reconcile E.U. and
U.S. securities laws? These issues will be discussed in Section IV of this Article.

IV. T OKENS AS “T RANSFERABLE S ECURITIES ” UNDER EU L AW
A. Black-Letter Law vs. Substance over Form
As discussed in Section III of this Article, the central definition for the
application of E.U. securities regulation is ‘transferable security’ pursuant to
Article 4(1)(44) MiFiD2. In contrast to U.S. securities regulation, its E.U.
counterpart rests on a black-letter law approach. This means that statutory
requirements within the regulation are set out in exacting detail. These
Funds: Part II, 28 COMPANY AND SEC. L.J. 370, 372–77 (2010); Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to
the Bottom: An Argument for the Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Law, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 1581 (2010).
166
167

168

Zetzsche et al., supra note 42, at 12.
David Lazer, Regulatory Interdependence and International Governance, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 474, 479–80
(2001).
Bollen, supra note 165, at 376.
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requirements leave little leeway for discretion. E.U. lawmakers employed these
detailed justifications because they wanted to achieve a uniform interpretation of
securities laws within E.U. member states. This black-letter approach usually
provides a high level of legal certainty for the markets. A “substance over form”
approach, as taken by the U.S. Supreme Court, would be in conflict with the
desired harmonization in the E.U. because courts in different E.U. member
states could come up with different approaches, resulting in a regulatory
patchwork.
It would be desirable if the Howey test as applied by the SEC and the E.U.
definition of “transferable securities” would come to similar results regarding the
classification of tokens. However, the E.U.’s black-letter approach does not
relate to requirements such as the “reasonable expectation of profit” and “profit
derived from the managerial efforts of others.” Instead, the E.U. definition
focuses on the transfer of securities. This leaves little room to use principles and
tests developed in the U.S. because the applicable E.U. regulation is too narrow.
E.U. regulators and courts are unable to simply adopt the Howey test because it is
not compatible with the wording of the respective E.U. law. Aligning the
classification of ICOs in the most important regions for ICOs would be a huge
step towards setting a global standard. Desired harmonization between E.U. and
U.S. financial markets regulation needs to start with the wording of the
applicable E.U. rules, interpreting them in a way that brings the legal framework
more into line with the U.S. approach, and using established statutory
interpretation techniques to avoid undesired results.

B. Negotiability on the Capital Market
Article 4(1)(44) MiFiD2 defines “transferable securities” as follows:
… those classes of securities which are negotiable on the capital market,
with the exception of instruments of payment, such as:
(a) shares in companies and other securities equivalent to shares in
companies, partnerships or other entities, and depositary receipts in respect
of shares;
(b) bonds or other forms of securitised debt, including depositary receipts in
respect of such securities;
(c) any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such
transferable securities or giving rise to a cash settlement determined by
reference to transferable securities, currencies, interest rates or yields,
commodities or other indices or measures.169

These requirements will be discussed in more detail in the following
subsection. Importantly, no definition of “securities” as such is provided. To our
169

MiFiD2, supra note 123, art. 4(1)(44).
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knowledge, there has not been a single decision of the Court of Justice of the
E.U. (CJEU) regarding the definition of securities in general. This results in
uncertainty for market participants and requires a very careful approach to the
definition.

1. Transferability
In order to be negotiable, a security needs to be transferable. This means
that there cannot be any obstacles that make the transfer impossible and there
cannot be any dependency on the fulfilment of certain formal criteria such as
notarial certification.170 The units do not require a physical embodiment, such as
a certificate, to be transferable.171 Hence the non-tangible nature of tokens is not
an issue in terms of transferability.172
The transferability of tokens can be restricted by the issuer. However, nontransferability would only result if the unit cannot be transferred at all. A mere
contractual restraint, such as a contractual prohibition of transfer or a required
approval of transfer by the issuer,173 does not change the fact that tokens are
generally transferable.174 Some issuers equip tokens with mechanisms that make
the transfer technically impossible (so-called “lockup”).175 In these cases,
ownership of the token remains, and can only remain, with the subscriber. As
this permanently rules out transfers, these tokens are not transferable securities
pursuant to Article 4 MiFiD2.176 As a consequence, E.U. financial markets
regulation does not apply. This is a significant difference from the Howey test
under U.S. securities regulation, which does not relate to transferability at all.
170

WOLFGANG GROß, KAPITALMARKTRECHT § 2 WpPG ¶ 3 (6th ed. 2016); Andreas Fuchs in
WpHG § 2 ¶ 15 (Andreas Fuchs ed., 2d ed. 2016); for discussion against the need for simple
transferability, see Heinz-Dieter Assmann in WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ § 2 ¶ 8, 10 (HeinzDieter Assmann & Uwe H. Schneider eds., 6th ed. 2012).

171

Gregor Roth in KÖLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM WpHG § 2 ¶ 37 (Heribert Hirte & Thomas Möllers
eds.,
2d
ed.
2014);
Wolf
von
Kopp-Colomb
&
Jörg
Schneider
in
WERTPAPIERPROSPEKTGESETZ/VERMÖGENSANLAGENGESETZ § 2 WPPG ¶ 9 (Heinz-Dieter
Assmann et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2017); ROBERT MÜLLER, WERTPAPIERPROSPEKTGESETZ § 2 ¶ 2 (2d
online ed. 2017); GROß, supra note 170, at § 2 WPPG ¶ 3. However, a certificate is typically
required by stock exchange listing rules.
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BAFIN, supra note 139; see also Zickgraf, supra note 73 at 299.
Fuchs, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 32; von Kopp-Colomb & J. Schneider, supra note 171, at § 2 WPPG
¶ 13; Anna Heidelbach in KAPITALMARKTRECHTS-KOMMENTAR § 2 WPPG para. 5 (Eberhard
Schwark & Daniel Zimmer eds., 4th ed. 2010).
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174
175

176

Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 20.
For example, the ICO of EOS. See EOS Mainnet Swap Update, BINANCE, (June 1, 2018),
http://perma.cc/5DT2-3DTY (Point 19: “EOS Tokens will become fixed (non-transferable) on
the Ethereum blockchain within 23 hours after the end of the final EOS Token distribution
period …”).
Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 20–21.
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However, in some ICOs these technical restrictions are just temporary.
Sometimes the transfer restriction is removed after a predefined time,177 making
the tokens transferable. Thus, from a structural perspective the token would not
be a transferable security during the initial offering (in the primary market), but
would transform into a transferable security later in the secondary market. It is
our view that, in these circumstances, the requirement of transferability should
be considered as being fulfilled from the beginning,178 which means from the
time of the initial offering. It is not sensible to classify a token as a transferable
security at one point in time during its lifecycle (such as when it is traded after
the lock has been removed) while negating its classification as a transferable
security at another point (such as when it is initially offered to the public). It is
obvious that E.U. lawmakers wanted to apply a uniform definition of
“transferable securities” throughout the E.U. financial markets regulation
landscape. This is why, as outlined in Section III, Subsection B, regulatory
cornerstones such as the Market Abuse Regulation and the Prospectus
Regulation also use the definition given in Article 4 MiFiD2.
There is also the problem of cherry picking. It would go against the
fundamental principles of investor protection179 if issuers could escape an
unpopular aspect of financial markets regulation (for example, the prospectus
requirement), but reap the rewards of having a fungible token that is more
attractive to prospective investors. Investors could also buy tokens using insider
knowledge. If the lockup is removed after the initial offering (thereby turning
the token into a “transferable security”) the ban on insider trading would be
ineffective because the respective trade would have taken place when the token
was not a transferable security and thus was beyond the scope of insider trading
regulation. Allowing such a technical bypass is unacceptable and opens a massive
loophole in E.U. financial markets regulation. If issuers want to remain outside
its scope of application, they need to ensure that none of its regulatory aspects
will apply. The only way to do so is to eliminate tradability of the token
permanently. Thus, tokens are “transferable” pursuant to Article 4(1) MiFiD2
from the beginning if transferability is made possible or a lockup is removed
after the ICO.

177
178

179

See, for example, FRIENDZ, WHITEPAPER 47, http://www.friendz.io/file/whitepaper_icofriendz.pdf.
The nature of the blockchain dictates that temporary or permanent lockups are set out in the code
of the blockchain from the very start. In other words, the nature of the lockup is clear from the
outset in that the nature of the token cannot be changed later.
For example, MiFiD2 highlights the need to improve and maintain investor protection in Recitals
70 and 86.
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2. Capital Markets
The term “capital markets” is not defined under E.U. law either. However,
the European Commission applies a broad interpretation which includes “all
contexts where buying and selling interests in securities meet.”180 This flexible
approach allows financial markets laws to be applied to new market structures
not anticipated when the regulation was drafted. However, this interpretation of
“capital markets” is still incomplete because it uses “securities” as part of the
definition, which again leads to the questions about what “securities” exactly are
in this context. Unsurprisingly, commentators also typically stay vague on the
issue because in the traditional stock market environment it is clear that the units
typically traded on an exchange (stocks, bonds, etc.) are securities. However, the
fact that tokens are not yet traded on traditional exchanges raises the question of
where to draw the line between capital markets and other markets.
It is our view that the essential issue is what market participants and
stakeholders consider to be a “capital market.” Capital markets are commonly
understood to be part of the financial markets.181 In capital markets, buyers and
sellers engage in the trade of financial securities such as stocks and bonds.182 For
example, the market types set out in Article 4(1) MiFiD2183 are capital markets.
Generally, one main difference between capital markets and other parts of the
financial markets,184 or markets other than financial markets, is the ongoing
relationship between the issuer and the investor based on the traded
instrument.185 Stocks provide investors with membership rights in the respective
company (typically voting and profit participation), while bonds create an
ongoing flow of funds from the issuer to the investor. In both cases the

180

EUROPEAN COMM’N, YOUR
WJ59.

181

See, for example, Kristina Zucchi, Financial Markets: Capital vs. Money Markets, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 2,
2018), http://perma.cc/4CSF-WUU7.

182

See, for example, Definition of ‘Capital Market’, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, http://perma.cc/Y3N5NJZM.

183

These are regulated markets (art. 4(1)(21)), multilateral trading facilities (art. 4(1)(22)) and
organized trading facilities (art. 4(1)(23)). See MiFiD2, supra note 123.
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For example, money markets or commodities markets.
A special case that this Article will not discuss in detail is an ICO of investment tokens without an
issuer, which means that the ICO was organized in a decentralized way. The DAO token sale was
one example of this type of ICO. For further discussion, see Laila Metjahic, Deconstructing the
DAO: The Need for Legal Recognition and the Application of Securities Laws to Decentralized Organizations,
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1533 (2018).
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investment is based on the expectation of profits.186 Profits should be
interpreted widely to include dividends and periodic payments.187 As a result, a
token granting a flow of monies (either in a fixed rate or depending on the
company’s profits) from the issuer to the investor is potentially negotiable on the
capital markets. If the token does not grant a flow of monies, but does grant
other rights that are typically linked to the status of a shareholder (in particular,
voting rights), it would also be considered a transferable security. In contrast, a
token cannot be a “transferable security” if it does not provide any such
membership rights, comparable rights, or monetary streams. Therefore, if the
possible return on investment can only stem from an increased value of the
tokens in the secondary market, the respective token is not an investment token
and a priori cannot be considered a “transferable security.”
As a result, hybrid tokens with some sort of investment aspect would be
negotiable on the capital markets. In contrast, pure cryptocurrency tokens would
not be classified as transferable securities as their structure is decentralized in
most cases; there is no ongoing relationship between issuer and “investor.” If a
pure utility token grants benefits (for example, vouchers for particular services
offered by the issuer), its focus is on consumption and not investment.188 Thus,
it would not be a “transferable security,” even if it were transferable189 and
potentially negotiable.
This approach is in line with the objectives of E.U. financial markets
regulation, which is, inter alia, to protect investors (and thus investment
decisions) and not consumers (and thus consumption decisions).190 The
distinction is similar to the investment/utility token dichotomy as described in
Section II of this Article. To a certain extent it also resembles the Howey test that
was discussed in Section III of this Article. However, the approaches differ in
certain respects. The Howey test is conclusive regarding the existence of an
“investment contract” and therefore the application of U.S. investment laws.
186

187

188
189

190

The fact that some investors may have objectives other than profit (for example, gaining influence
in a company) does not change the fact that securities regulation rests upon the assumption that
the typical investor is seeking profits.
The U.S. Supreme Court goes one step further and even includes the “increased value of the
investment” in the definition of profits. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004).
Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 29; Zickgraf, supra note 73, at 304.
Some commentators seem to consider it sufficient for the classification as an “investment token”
if the token is tradeable in a secondary market; see, for example, Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70 at
13 (“…even tokens that mainly aspire to serve as a utility token typically will have an investment
component as tokens can be traded, and hence sold at a profit, at token exchanges (secondary
markets) subsequent to the ICO.”). This theory is not convincing because it overstretches the idea
of “investment”—the mere possibility of buying and selling something, even in a structured
marketplace, does not make it an “investment.”
Klöhn et al., supra note 68, at 101.
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Using the typical characteristics of securities as a constituent element of “capital
markets” under Article 4(1) MiFiD2 merely eliminates the applications of E.U.
financial markets laws to tokens that have clearly nothing to do with the capital
markets.
We are aware that under this approach some tokens that are commonly
described as utility tokens would fall under the scope of E.U. financial markets
regulation. For example, the conveyance of voting rights is sometimes provided
as an example of utility tokens although it is a classical membership right. 191
However, this divergence is not surprising because the classifications of tokens
have evolved in the markets, whereas the MiFiD2 definitions follow a blackletter approach to financial markets regulation. It is a common phenomenon in
fintech regulation that common understandings and legal definitions are
diverging.
Furthermore, tokens that do not confer profit participation or voting rights
do not fulfill the definition of “transferable securities,” although investors are
betting on an increase in value of their investment. However, the fact that the
transferable security prerequisites are not met does not mean that those
investments are not regulated at all. Such tokens might be subject to other
existing regulatory regimes (for example, payment system regulation, anti-money
laundering regulations, and crypto exchange rules). It is also possible that the
increasing importance of currency tokens will trigger new forms of regulation,
such as new specific licensing requirements for trading venues. However, this is
not a question of securities regulation but of currency and payment regulation.

3. Negotiability
Pursuant to Article 4(1)(44) MiFiD2, tokens need to be negotiable to be
considered “transferable securities.”192 In contrast to “transferability,” which
refers to the mere possibility of being traded, a unit is negotiable if its format
allows its sale or purchase in a structured market setting (such as in the capital
markets).193 This can also be referred to as the “ease” of the transfer. Strictly
speaking, the concept of negotiability already contains the notion that the
instrument is transferable.194

191

192
193

194

See, for example, Josiah Wilmoth, The Difference Between Utility Tokens and Equity Tokens, STRATEGIC
COIN, http://perma.cc/BV2S-X4TK.
Sometimes also referred to as “tradeable” or “fungible.”
Fuchs, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 16; Roth, supra note 171, at § 2 ¶ 27; Assmann, supra note 170, at
§ 2 ¶ 8 et seq.; Christoph Kumpan in KAPITALMARKTRECHTS-KOMMENTAR § 2 WpHG ¶ 9
(Eberhard Schwark & Daniel Zimmer eds., 4th ed. 2010).
Assmann, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 10; Fuchs, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 16.
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Tokens can typically be considered “negotiable.”195 The wording
(“negotiable” instead of “negotiated”) demonstrates that the tokens do not need
to be traded on an exchange. “If the securities in question are of a kind that is
capable of being traded” on the trading facilities regulated under MiFiD2, it is “a
conclusive indication that they are transferable securities.”196 As of publication,
tokens are not traded on classical stock exchanges, rather they are traded on
various crypto exchanges.197 Any investment token listed on a crypto exchange is
a negotiable security. The same applies to non-traded tokens with characteristics
similar to those that are already traded because it is sufficient that such units
could be traded in the future.198 In other words, any token would be considered
negotiable unless it is clear from the outset that it will never be traded on a
crypto exchange or a similar facility. It is hard to imagine why a token could not
be traded in such a venue. This wide understanding is in line with the view taken
by the European Commission regarding classical securities. It stated that even if
the respective units are not capable of being traded in multilateral systems, this is
not conclusive evidence that they are not negotiable.199
Some commentators argue that the respective units need to allow for an
increased level of reliability and security regarding the transaction.200 In
particular, market participants need to be sure that third parties cannot assert
rights after the securities have been transferred.201 This is a consequence of the
anonymized trading in the capital markets. In classical securities settings, this
refers to the possibility to acquire the items in good faith.202 The necessary

195
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Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 22.
EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 180, at 46.
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For examples of a crypto exchange, see BINANCE, http://perma.cc/G4S3-LP59; IDEX,
http://idex.market/.
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Fuchs, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 17; Assmann, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 9; see also Kumpan, supra note
193, at § 2 WpHG ¶ 9; Roth, supra note 171, at § 2 ¶ 36.
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EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 180, at 46.
Kumpan, supra note 193, at § 2 WpHG ¶ 9; cf. Fuchs, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 18; contra von KoppColomb & Schneider, supra note 171, at § 2 WpHG ¶ 9; Assmann, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 17; cf.
Second Report on EU Clearing and Settlement Arrangements, THE GIOVANNINI GROUP, at 15–16 (Apr.
2003), http://perma.cc/S85N-D5DP.
Kumpan, supra note 193, at § 2 WpHG ¶ 9.
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Fuchs, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 16. The term “good faith” (bona fide) refers to a transaction where
a person acquires a movable good from someone he erroneously considers to be entitled to
transfer ownership to him. In most civil law jurisdictions, the acquirer would nevertheless become
the owner unless the movable good had been stolen or lost. For overview, see Arthur F.
Salomons, Good Faith Acquisition of Movables, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 1065 (Arthur
S. Hartkamp et al. eds., 4th ed. 2010).
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protection can also be provided by equivalent means.203 Nevertheless, even if
such an (unwritten) reliability requirement were necessary, it would not be an
issue because tokens are based on blockchain technology.204 As outlined in
Section II of this Article, all transactions are recorded in the blockchain. Once
the recording has taken place, it is virtually impossible to change the respective
data.205 The result is an extraordinarily high level of reliability and security that
arguably exceeds the level of protection granted by the rules of acquisition in
good faith.

4. Standardization
Negotiability requires the respective units to be standardized.206 This flows
from the concept of capital markets transactions, which are executed
anonymously and require the respective units to be identifiable and
enumerable.207 Transactions need to be possible without further negotiations
between the parties.208 The definition in Article 4(1)(44) MiFiD2, which refers to
“classes of securities,” also affirms this understanding.209
Standardization does not require that all units available in the markets share
the same characteristics. In practice, other securities such as stocks come in
different varieties (ordinary stocks, preferred stocks, bearer stocks, registered
shares, etc.).210 Similarly, there are various types of tokens that have varying
characteristics. However, this does not mean that tokens are not “standardized”
pursuant to Article 4(1)(44) MiFiD2. It is not necessary that all tokens from
different issuers are standardized, which means that certain “typical” tokens are
circulating in the markets.211 Instead, the standardization requirement seeks to
exclude securities that have been customized for particular customers,212 as this
would create uncertainties in the market environment. If all tokens in a particular
ICO are of the same kind, or the ICO comprises different classes of tokens that
203

204
205
206

207

208
209
210
211
212

Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 22; Kumpan, supra note 193, at § 2 WpHG ¶ 9; Fuchs, supra
note 170, at § 2 ¶ 16 (stating that in addition to the possibility of an acquisition in good faith, the
necessary protection can be granted by further statutory provisions).
Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 22.
See supra pp. 556–7.
See Rüdiger Veil, Financial Instruments, in EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS LAW, § 8 ¶ 5 (Rüdiger Veil
ed., 2d ed. 2017).
Kumpan, supra note 193, at § 2 WpHG ¶ 7; Roth, supra note 171, at § 2 ¶ 24; Zickgraf, supra note
73, at 299.
Roth, supra note 171, at § 2 ¶ 29.
Kumpan, supra note 193, at § 2 WpHG ¶ 7.
Cf. Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 20.
Zickgraf, supra note 73, at 300.
Roth, supra note 171, at § 2 ¶ 24.
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are clearly identifiable and therefore negotiable, the standardization requirement
is met. This is typically the case in ICOs.
It is also irrelevant that tokens are sometimes purchased in increments (for
example, 0.57 units). The reason is that the subscription interface often asks for
the amount the subscriber is willing to invest, translating the investment amount
into parts of a token. This is the same principle that is applied to the purchase of
exchange traded funds (ETFs). However, “standardization” does not require the
units in question to be traded in full.213 Even if increments of a token are traded,
they remain identifiable and thus standardized.

5. No Payment Instruments
According to Article 4(1)(44) MiFiD2, “payment instruments” are not
transferable securities. Similar to “capital markets,” the term is not defined by
MiFiD2214 and needs to be interpreted according to the general understanding in
the markets. The definition encompasses classical means of payment such as
cash and checks.215 It also applies to non-cash payment mediums such as debit
or credit cards, credit transfers, direct debits, and e-money.216 Currency tokens
fall within this category because they are designed to function as a means of
payment, which means that they are payment instruments and thus not
transferable securities. They exhibit strong similarities to e-money,217 which is
classified as a payment instrument.218 This view is in line with the famous
Hedqvist decision in which the CJEU held that Bitcoins are contractual payment
instruments.219 U.S. Magistrate Judge Mazzant expressed a similar view in SEC
litigation against a Ponzi scheme based on a Bitcoin operation.220 In contrast,
213

This is also a consequence of the fact that no physical embodiment of the security (which would
typically refer to full units) is required.

214

The definition in Article 4(14) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (Second Payment Services Directive)
referring to “personalised devices” cannot be applied because it is used in a non-capital markets
context.
Roth, supra note 171, at § 2 ¶ 41; Assmann, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 12.
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See Payment Instruments, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, http://perma.cc/YS4B-BKFJ.
Id.
Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 31.
Case C-264/14, Skatteverket v. David Hedqvist, 2015 E.C.R. 718. In this case, a Swedish national
wanted to offer a service enabling customers to change money into Bitcoin and vice versa.
Traditional currency exchanges are exempt from value added tax under Article 135(1) of Directive
2006/112/EC (VAT Directive). Thus, the issue was whether Bitcoin could be considered
equivalent to a legal tender within the meaning of the Directive. Although the CJEU affirmed the
application of the exemption, it is unclear if this can also apply to securities regulation because the
structure and purpose differs from tax law.
SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (“It is clear
that Bitcoin can be used as money”).
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investment tokens and utility tokens are not payment instruments. Although
they can be used as consideration (for example, in a barter agreement or as a
replacement for a cash payment if agreed on by the parties), they are not
designed to be a means of payment.
The issue is how hybrid tokens (in particular, tokens with investment and
payment features) fit into the picture. It is our view that tokens can only be
considered as a “payment instrument” if their sole or main purpose is to be used
for payments.221 This flows from the classification described in Section II of this
Article. Currency tokens have been defined as decentralized and not carrying any
inherent value. If a currency token combines payment functions with investment
aspects that are not based only on rising rates or prices, it would not be classified
as currency but an investment token. As a result, it would not be a payment
instrument.
In any event, an interpretation of the legal framework irrespective of the
token classification would reach the same conclusion for three reasons. First, the
“payment instrument” rule is an exception to the general rule that units that are
negotiable in the capital markets are transferable securities. An exception to a
general rule needs to be applied cautiously, which means in ambiguous cases the
general rule would apply. Thus, the statutory exemption for payment
instruments would only apply in cases in which it is unambiguously clear that the
token is exclusively used for payment purposes. For hybrid tokens this will
hardly ever be the case. Second, our view aligns with the purpose of financial
markets regulation. The definitions contained in Article 4 MiFiD2 apply to the
whole E.U. financial markets regulation framework. Instruments of payment are
primarily subject to E.U. banking and payment regulation. Both areas of law can
apply simultaneously if a token exhibits characteristics of a security and a
payment instrument. In particular, banking regulation would not make financial
markets regulation inapplicable if a token can be used, or is supposed to be used,
both as a payment instrument and a security. Third, a wide interpretation of the
exception would open regulatory gaps and allow regulatory arbitrage. If adding
some limited payment functionality would result in the inapplicability of Article
4(1)(44) MiFiD2, issuers would have a simple way of escaping financial markets
regulation even if the token conveyed significant investor rights.

C. Comparability as an Unwritten Requirement?
Other commentators want to introduce another unwritten requirement
into the definition of “transferable securities.”222 They argue that Article 4(1)(44)
221
222

Cf. Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 35–36.
Hacker & Thomale, supra note 70, at 24; cf. Fuchs, supra note 170, at § 2 ¶ 19.
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MiFiD2 provides a non-exhaustive list of transferable securities (stocks, bonds,
and respective call/put options). In particular, this list consists of examples
which reflected E.U. lawmakers’ idea of what type of securities would be
regulated under MiFiD2. Accordingly, new types of securities would need to be
functionally equivalent, or at least comparable, to the listed examples.223
The purpose of this approach is sensible. In theory, the wide ambit of the
criterion “negotiability on the capital markets” could result in the application of
securities laws to units that have little or nothing to do with the common
understanding of securities. However, the legal technique behind the approach is
unconvincing. The term “such as” in the definition of “transferable securities” in
Article 4(1)(44) MiFiD2 suggests that the listed securities are mere examples. It
is a plausible assumption that by listing these three forms of securities, E.U.
lawmakers wanted to express what they considered to be typical manifestations
of securities in the markets at the time of drafting the regulation. However, there
is no indication that only comparable units can be classified as “transferable
securities.” In addition, it is unclear what level of comparability would be
necessary.
Nevertheless, if the definition of “transferable securities” is applied
correctly, there is no need for a comparability requirement. As discussed above,
units must possess certain minimum investment features if they are capable of
being traded in the “capital markets.” This interpretation of the statutory
definition draws a line between investment, utility, and cryptocurrency tokens. It
does not inject an unwritten element into the definition, but allows a distinction
based on the wording of the provision and the general understanding in the
markets. It also avoids the tricky question as to what exactly is “comparable” to
a stock or a bond. The applicable test is whether there is any investment feature
embodied in the token.

D. Derivatives
The definition of “transferable securities” in Article 4(1)(44)(c) also
includes “any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such
transferable securities or giving rise to a cash settlement determined by reference
to transferable securities, currencies, interest rates or yields, commodities or
other indices or measures.”224 The list of referenced units is extremely wide. The
background is that with respect to derivative classification, it is not important
that the relevant unit itself is a security. For example, a forward contract on
oranges would also be a transferable security. As a consequence, derivatives on
223
224

Id.
MiFiD2, supra note 123.
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tokens would be classified as “transferable securities” even if the token lacks
investment features.
This interpretation coincides with the view taken by the FCA. Because a
growing number of financial service providers offer cryptocurrency-related
services, the FCA issued new guidance, stating that derivatives on
cryptocurrencies (in particular, futures, options, and contracts for difference)
may be financial instruments under the MiFiD2 framework.225 As a consequence,
firms offering these derivatives would require authorization. Similarly, the
French AMF concluded that cryptocurrencies are eligible underlying assets for
derivatives because the list contained in Article 4(1)(44) MiFiD2 is a mere list of
examples.226 European lawmakers have provided themselves leeway to expand
the list of eligible underlying assets, and by referring to notions of an increasingly
broader scope, this enables them to keep in step with innovation in the
industry.227 The AMF also pointed out that market services regarding crypto
derivatives would require authorization and that crypto derivatives are subject to
the obligations set out in Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 on OTC Derivatives,
Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories (commonly referred to as the
European Market Infrastructure Regulation, or EMIR), in particular the
obligation to report transactions to a trade repository.228

E. Result
Tokens are transferable unless they have a permanent lockup function.
They are negotiable unless there are elements that make listing at an exchange
platform impossible. The blockchain technology allows secure transactions,
which would be sufficient if an increased form of negotiability was necessary.
The “capital markets” requirement limits the scope of the definition to tokens
with some sort of investment function. However, the token does not need to be
comparable to a stock or a bond. Tokens are countable and thus traded
anonymously, making them sufficiently standardized. It is irrelevant if tokens
have payment functionality. Only if its main or only function is payment would
tokens fall out of the scope of the definition of “transferable securities.” In sum,
most of the tokens that are commonly described as “investment tokens” would
be considered as “transferable securities” pursuant to Article 4(1)(44) MiFiD2.
The result is remarkably similar to the SEC’s approach using the Howey test.
Thus, it is possible to reconcile the scope of application of U.S. and E.U.
225
226
227
228

FCA, supra note 134.
AMF, supra note 144, at 2–3.
Id.
Id. at 1.
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securities laws. The only major difference is the classification of investment
tokens that are not transferable due to a lockup. It remains to be seen whether
the SEC will address this issue in the future.

V. C ONCLUSION
In this Article, we reviewed the different approaches taken by regulators
regarding the legal framework for ICOs in major financial markets. We
submitted that harmonization between different jurisdictions is highly desirable
because a race to the bottom and unregulated areas need to be avoided. A major
obstacle could be that there are differences in the pivotal definitions for the
application of securities laws. Most significantly, U.S. law refers to “investment
contract,” while E.U. law focuses on “transferable securities.” Our analysis
shows that only tokens that lack any form of investment component would not
be classified as transferable securities under E.U. law. This demonstrates a high
level of comparability between the E.U. and U.S. legal frameworks. This is
desirable because it avoids diverging or even competing frameworks for ICOs in
these areas. The only major difference could be the classification of tokens that
are non-transferable due to a lockup and would thus not be “transferable
securities” under E.U. law. The U.S. Howey test does not take into account
transferability as a requirement for “investment contracts.” If the SEC addresses
this issue in the future, even a full alignment of U.S. and E.U. law could be
achieved. This would be a huge step towards harmonized ICO regulation.
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